I. Introduction
The federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides cash assistance to more than 7.1 million aged, blind, and disabled persons in the U.S. who are below federally mandated income and asset limits. In terms of total spending it is now second only to Medicaid among means-tested programs with more than $38 billion in 2004 expenditures. The number of individuals receiving SSI benefits has grown substantially during the past fifteen years, from 4.59 million in December of 1989 to 7.18 million by April of 2006. The increase in SSI receipt over this period has been especially rapid among children under the age of 18, with their ranks increasing from 0.26 to 1.06 million. The result of this growth, along with an increase in SSI enrollment among adults with children, is that 6 percent of children now reside in a household with SSI income. This is more than double the corresponding share in 1990.
Our main goal in this paper is to investigate the impact of a child's enrollment in SSI on key outcome measures such as poverty, parental earnings, and health insurance coverage. Identification of a causal impact of program participation is inherently difficult for at least three reasons. First, as with other means-tested programs, a family's eligibility for the program is determined in part by a family's economic circumstance. Cross-sectional comparisons of households with and without SSI benefits would therefore potentially be biased by some amount of reverse causation. Furthermore, a child must have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment in order to qualify for SSI benefits. Having a child with a disability may exert an independent effect on a parent's optimal labor supply or other decisions, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of the program from this potentially confounding factor. And finally, SSI is a federal program that exhibits almost no variation across states or other geographic areas. Thus whereas previous research has exploited cross-state variation in benefit amounts and eligibility criteria to identify the effect of other means-tested programs such as AFDC, Medicaid, and food stamps, such an empirical strategy is unlikely to succeed in this context. 1 1 Some states do supplement the federal SSI benefit. But these supplements are quite small for children and accounted for just 3 percent of all SSI benefits paid during the 2005 calendar year. The corresponding share for adults was 13 percent, and thus the supplements are a more useful source of variation in program incentives for this group. See Powers (1998, 2000) for analyses that exploit the cross-state heterogeneity in state To surmount these obstacles to identification, we exploit longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) that enables us to observe household outcomes in the months leading up to and immediately following a child's first enrollment in the SSI program. This strategy allows us to control for unobserved, time-invariant differences across households that might bias crosssectional estimates. The key identifying assumption of this approach is that the precise timing of the award of SSI benefits to the child is not correlated with other changes that influence the household outcome being studied. Note that this strategy would not be appropriate for studying the causal effect of most other government expenditure programs, such as unemployment insurance, TANF, or social security, as enrollment in those programs would often be precipitated by a discrete change in the employment status or health of adults in the household.
But in the case of child SSI enrollment, this strategy seems appropriate for two reasons. First, the vast majority of children awarded SSI benefits have a chronic rather than an acute condition.
2 Thus it is not the case that most children apply for the program after a discrete change in health status, which might itself influence parental labor supply or other outcome variables of interest. Instead, children are likely to apply after learning about the program from a welfare caseworker, a physician, an advocacy group, or a school counselor (Bound et al, 1998; Garrett and Glied, 2000; Kubik, 1999) . Second, there is typically a substantial lag between the initial application for SSI benefits and the eventual award (if one is made), with this lag averaging 4.3 months for awardees under the age of 18. 3 This lag occurs both because the Social Security Administration (SSA) must determine a child's eligibility for the program and because the state Disability Determination Service (DDS) must decide whether the child has a "medically supplements for adult SSI recipients to identify the impact of the program on the labor supply and savings of near elderly individuals. 2 For example, in 2003 approximately 67 percent of children awarded SSI benefits had a mental disorder as their primary diagnosis and fewer than two percent qualified because of an injury or a disease of the circulatory system. 3 The length of the time lag will depend both on the SSA and on the state DDS. As described on the SSA website, after a child disability report is formally submitted to SSA, "We review it to make sure all of the information is complete. We may contact you for missing or unclear information; We will contact you to complete a formal application for benefits, if you haven't already done one; We send the child's forms to the State office that determines if the child is disabled under Social Security law; The State office requests medical records from the hospitals, doctors, and other treatment sources and information from the child's teachers, schools, and other people whom you listed as having information about the child's illnesses, injuries or conditions; The State office then reviews all the information it obtains." determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that causes marked and severe functional limitations" (SSA, 1998) .
One potential concern with this approach is that a family might apply for child SSI benefits because of a change in circumstances. For example, a parent might apply for the program after losing his or her job or in response to a decline in the child's health. Failing to account for this could lead to a biased estimate of the impact of SSI enrollment. But because of the longitudinal nature of our data, we can investigate whether there are changes in outcome variables of interest such as earnings, poverty status, and health insurance coverage in the months leading up to the first receipt of SSI benefits and thus avoid erroneously assigning a causal interpretation to any observed change in outcomes. 4 Previous work on child SSI participation has documented the shifting of children from the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to the SSI program during the 1990s (Kubik 1999 (Kubik , 2003 Garrett and Glied, 2000; Schmidt and Sevak, 2004) . The only paper of which we are aware that investigates the relationship between child SSI participation and individual-level outcomes other than program participation is Kubik (1999) . Kubik exploits the variation across states in the potential financial gain to a family from moving a child from AFDC to SSI. Using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), he documents that in the four years following the 1990 liberalization, female-headed households in states with higher potential SSI gains were more likely to identify that their child suffered from a health impairment (in particular a mental health impairment), to take their child to a doctor, and to report that their child needs special education.
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This paper builds on the previous literature by asking how enrollment of a child in SSI affects household-level economic outcomes. We begin our empirical analysis with an investigation of the 4 An alternative approach would be to instrument for SSI benefit receipt with the level of state supplementation of the federal SSI benefit. Powers (1998, 2000) implement such a strategy in their studies of the effect of SSI participation on pre-retirement savings and labor supply among the near elderly. However, as noted above, this is not as appropriate in the context of child SSI participation because state SSI supplements for children are very small and vary little over time. The authors' attempts at such an IV approach produced estimates that were very imprecisely estimated. 5 Using data from the March CPS, Kubik also finds that a family's receipt of SSI benefits has a negative effect on the probability that the head of the family works. But as he points out, it is not possible to separately identify the effect of child and adult SSI participation, which is potentially problematic as we discuss below.
demographic and institutional determinants of SSI child participation using data for all households with children from the 1992 the , 1993 the , 1996 This presents a picture of what types of households are enrolling children in the SSI program and how they differ from other households without a child on the program.
The remainder of the paper focuses on the estimation of the impact of child SSI enrollment on a number of household outcomes. Our first set of findings demonstrates that the enrollment of a child on SSI leads to an increase in total household unearned income of $1,650 defined over a four-month period, compared to an increase in total SSI income of $1,747. (Outcomes are defined in the SIPP over a survey "wave", which constitutes a four-month period.) These estimates imply that the increase in SSI income greatly exceeds any offsetting reduction in transfer income from other programs such as TANF and food stamps. Looking at household earnings, we find no statistically significant changes in the level of earnings, the probability of positive household earnings, or log earnings conditional on positive earnings.
However, the pattern of coefficients and the results for alternate estimation samples, suggests that there might be some decrease in conditional earnings on the order of 5 to 10 percent. Total household income increases by an average of approximately 22 percent after a child enrolls in SSI.
Our next set of findings demonstrates that the enrollment of a child on SSI leads to a statistically significant, substantial, and persistent reduction in the probability that a household lives in poverty. We find a statistically significant reduction of 10.8 percentage points in the probability that a household is in poverty following enrollment of a child in SSI. This stems in large part from an effect on deep poverty, which we define to be less than 50 percent of the poverty line. Because the typical child receiving SSI has one or more siblings, our estimates suggest an even larger effect on the number of children in poverty.
The observed increase in family income need not have implied a reduction in poverty rates for two reasons. First, although SSI is a means-tested program, a child can still qualify for the program even if his/her family income is substantially above the poverty line. For example, a family with one parent and two children could have earnings of more than $30,000 per year and yet still receive SSI benefits. Second, it is an empirical question as to whether the increase in transfer income associated with SSI participation, net of any offsetting decrease in earned or other income, is sufficient to lift a family out of poverty.
Our final set of estimates focuses on the impact of SSI participation on the health insurance coverage of children. Because SSI recipients are immediately eligible for health insurance through the Medicaid program in most states, it is plausible that child SSI enrollment leads to an increase in health insurance coverage among children. We find little evidence to support this conjecture. While Medicaid coverage does increase substantially among children following SSI enrollment, most of the children who
were not already on Medicaid had private health insurance just prior to enrollment in SSI. Taken together, our results suggest that the growth of SSI enrollment has substantially lowered poverty rates among affected children but that it has had little impact on labor supply or health insurance coverage.
II. Background

A. The Growth in SSI Enrollment among Children
The first cash payments from the Supplemental Security Income program were disbursed in January of 1974, when 51 state-level programs that had assisted low-income aged, blind, and disabled adults were consolidated into one federal program. 6 In its first year, more than 60 percent of the 4.0 million SSI recipients were above the age of 65 and less than two percent were under the age of 18. Thirty years later in November of 2005, there were approximately 2.0 million elderly adults, 4.1 million aged 18 to 64, and more than 1.0 million children receiving SSI benefits. The growth in SSI enrollment has made it much more important as a source of cash assistance for low-income families with children. In 1989 there were 15.7 times more families on AFDC than with a child on SSI. 7 But by 2005 that ratio had fallen to less than 2.0. As we demonstrate below, if one accounts for adult SSI enrollment, then the receipt of SSI benefits is now more common than TANF receipt among households with children.
Much of the increase in child SSI participation was precipitated by the February 1990 Supreme 6 See Daly and Burkhauser (2003) for more details on the SSI program, its history, and a review of the SSI literature. 7 According to tabulations performed by Paul Davies at the Social Security Administration at the request of the authors, approximately 19% of child SSI recipients have a sibling on the program. We multiply the number of children on SSI by (0.81 + (0.19 / 2)) to approximate the number of families with one or more children on SSI.
Court decision in Sullivan v. Zebley, which had the effect of liberalizing the medical eligibility criteria for children to qualify for SSI. In the seven years following that decision, the number of children on SSI increased by 260 percent to more than 955,000. This represented an increase from 0.4 to 1.4 percent of all children between the ages of 0 and 17. 8 This period of rapid growth represented a sharp break in the slight upward trend prior to Zebley: during the four years from 1985 to 1989 the number of children on SSI increased by only 37,500. Previous research has demonstrated that in the years following this liberalization of the medical eligibility criteria for SSI enrollment by children, there was substantial shifting of children from the AFDC program to the SSI program. In states where the child SSI benefit exceeded the marginal AFDC benefit associated with that child, a family receiving AFDC income had an incentive to move an eligible child from AFDC to SSI, as a child could not legally receive benefits from both programs. Furthermore, as AFDC was jointly funded by states and the federal government and SSI is federally funded (though some states choose to supplement state benefits) it was also in the states' financial interest to move eligible children from AFDC to SSI. Kubik (1999 Kubik ( , 2003 and Garrett and Glied (2000) provide evidence that both individuals and states responded to these incentives and that substantial shifting occurred. Schmidt and Sevak (2004) provide evidence that female-headed households in states aggressively pursuing welfare reform in more recent years were more likely to have SSI income.
The growth in SSI receipt after the Zebley decision was driven primarily by an increase in the number of children qualifying for the program because of a mental disorder. Press accounts and anecdotes of children being "coached" to display behavioral disorders in order to be determined medically eligible for SSI led to a concern that the disability standard for children had become too lenient. Perhaps partly in response to this concern, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 8 The fraction of children affected was even higher given that the average child SSI recipient has 1.4 siblings.
Act (PRWORA) legislation required SSA to use a stricter standard of disability for child SSI applicants and to reevaluate the eligibility status of almost one-third of recipients (Kubik, 1999) . 9 This put an end to the rapid growth in child SSI participation. Nearly 100,000 children were terminated from the rolls in 1997 (with most deemed "no longer disabled") because of this legislation and the number on SSI remained roughly constant during the subsequent three years. Notably, SSI receipt among children started to increase again in 2000, growing by more than 4 percent per year through November of 2005.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the fraction of children now receiving SSI is greater than it was before the 1997 tightening induced by PRWORA. percent of households had one or more children under the age of 18 in the first wave.
B. SSI Program Parameters and Rules
In Table 1 we summarize data on SSI and AFDC/TANF benefit receipt for all households with at least one child under the age of eighteen from the first wave of the 1990, 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP surveys. In all of our analyses we focus on households rather than families because of the likelihood that economic resources of one family in the household will to some extent spill over to the other. This data paints a stark picture of how the delivery of cash assistance to low-income families with children has changed over the past 15 years. As shown in the table, between 1990 and 1996, the percent of children in households with welfare income climbed on net from 10.3 to 11.4 percent, while the percent with SSI income climbed from 2.8 percent to 5.1 percent. By 2004, the percent of children in households with SSI 12 One reason why the SIPP is considered to be the most reliable source of individual-level data on participation in government expenditure programs is that the survey is conducted three times per year and thus individuals need only recall their program participation during the preceding four months (Ham and Shore-Shepard, 2005) . 13 Starting in 2001, Current Population Survey (CPS) data began recording whether SSI income received by a respondent was on behalf of a disabled or blind child. However, authors' tabulations of this data imply that the CPS substantially understates the fraction of SSI recipients who are children. 14 The first ten surveys each followed a nationally representative sample of approximately 20,000 households for three years, or nine four-month "waves". Thus during the period from 1984 to 1993 there were typically three surveys ongoing at any time. The 1996 survey followed a sample of 36,730 households for four years (12 waves) and the 2001 survey followed a sample of 35,106 households for three years (9 waves). As with most longitudinal surveys there is some attrition in the SIPP, though the Census adjusts person and household weights in each wave to account for differential attrition by observable characteristics.
income reached 6.0 percent, while the number in households with welfare income fell by more than half to 4.9 percent. It thus appears to be true that there are now more children living in households with SSI income than living in households with TANF income. These data also suggest that the recent growth in SSI has to some extent offset the dramatic decrease in welfare caseloads. benefits among recipient households ($2,342 versus $1,178). This change was largely driven by the fact that SSI benefit amounts are inflation-adjusted whereas welfare benefits are not. Thus both because of the more generous benefits and because of the greater fraction of households enrolled, SSI has become a much larger source of cash assistance than TANF for households with children.
B. The Demographic Determinants of Household SSI Receipt
In this section we explore which observable household characteristics are related with program participation. We estimate probit models predicting receipt of child SSI benefits, and for the sake of comparison, adult SSI benefits and welfare (AFDC or TANF) benefits. Our sample consists of the 42,170
households with a child under the age 18 in the first wave of the pooled 1992 , 1993 , 1996 surveys. We begin with the 1992 version of the SIPP because it is the first survey year to differentiate between child and adult SSI receipt. 16 The public-use 2004 survey data does not include state identifiers so we do not include that data in our analyses. In this pooled sample, the percentage of households with a child receiving SSI benefits in one or more months is 1.6 percent; the percent receiving adult SSI is 2.6 percent, and the percent receiving welfare (AFDC or TANF) is 8.5 percent.
Our regression model is specified as follows, with j, k, and t indexing households, states, and
15 Dollar values cited here and elsewhere in the paper are inflation adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). 16 For children under the age of 15 who are receiving SSI benefits the income will be reported as SSI child income for an adult in the household (the unit of observation in the SIPP is a person-month). Thus if there are multiple children in the household under age 15 it is not possible to determine which one is receiving SSI. For children who are 15-17 years old, SSI benefits will either be reported as child SSI income for an adult in the household or as adult SSI income for the child. The variable KidsB jkt B controls for the number of children in the household between the ages of 0 and 17.
All else equal this should be positively related with the probability of having a child on SSI. The variable BoysB jkt B is separately included because boys are much more likely than girls to receive child SSI benefits.T P 17 P T as they are substantially more likely to have mental and behavioral disorders. The model also controls for the presence of one or more parents in the household, the education level of the more educated parent (or guardian if no parent is present), and the race and ethnicity of the children. The variable GenAFDCB jkt B is intended to capture the effect of the benefit generosity of the state's welfare program. It is defined as the maximum AFDC or TANF benefit in state k in year t given the size of family j.T P
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The variable SSISuppB kt B is an indicator that equals one if state k supplemented child SSI benefits in year t and zero otherwise.T P
19
P T
The model also includes indicator variables for year to control for any time effects shared across households.
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the mean values of all the explanatory variables included in the regression model. Column (2) reports the estimated marginal effects of these variables on the likelihood of child SSI benefits in the household. The results summarized in column (2) indicate that the likelihood of child SSI benefits is significantly positively related with the number of children in a household and increases in the number of boys in the household. This is not surprising as boys constitute a larger share of the overall SSI child caseload, in particular owing to the greater documented prevalence of mental disorders among boys. The estimated positive coefficients on MomOnly, DadOnly, and Neither imply that children living in a household with two parents are significantly less likely to receive SSI than their
There is substantial evidence from the fields of child and clinical psychology that boys are more likely than girls to experience mental disorders.
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We approximate this as the number of children plus the number of parents in the household.
T P
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The AFDC/TANF and SSI supplement data were obtained from various years of the publications Overview of Entitlement Programs and State Assistance Programs for SSI Recipients, respectively. counterparts in families headed by one parent or by a guardian that is not the parent. The estimated marginal effects also imply that children with less educated parents are statistically significantly more likely to receive SSI benefits, controlling for other demographic characteristics.
Interestingly, the generosity of welfare benefits in a household's state of residence is a statistically significant negative determinant of whether the household receives child SSI benefits. This corroborates the findings of Garrett and Glied (2000) and Kubik (1999) , discussed above. The data also indicate that a child is more likely to receive SSI when living in a state that supplements the federal benefit. 20 The estimated marginal effects on Black and Hispanic imply that conditional on other household characteristics, black children are significantly more likely to receive SSI benefits than white children, but Hispanic children are not. And finally, the estimates for the coefficients on the three year indicator variables (1992 is omitted) confirm a significant increase in child SSI receipt over time.
For the sake of comparison and contrast, columns (3) and (4) present analogous estimates for adult SSI receipt and AFDC/TANF receipt among households with children. For the receipt of adult SSI benefits, neither the number of children nor the number of boys is significantly related to program participation. The financial generosity of the state's AFDC/TANF program is also not significantly related with adult SSI receipt. These findings, which contrast with the results from the first specification, suggest that the corresponding estimates for child SSI enrollment are not simply capturing the influence of omitted characteristics of residents of a state that influence SSI receipt generally rather than child enrollment specifically. They also serve to bolster our confidence that the SIPP is accurately recording whether household SSI benefits are due to child or adult program participation. The coefficient estimates for family structure, education of the parent, race and ethnicity of the children, and year effects are qualitatively similar to those for child SSI receipt.
The results presented in the final column show that household structure, parental education, and the race and ethnicity of the children have a similar relationship with the likelihood of AFDC/TANF 20 Specifying this variable with the dollar amount of supplementation instead of an indicator variable for supplementation also yields positive point estimates, though these are not statistically significant.
receipt as they do with child SSI receipt. But three differences with the child SSI results are worth noting.
First, whereas the number of children is significantly positively related with AFDC/TANF receipt, the relationship is not significantly stronger for households with relatively many boys. Second, while child SSI receipt is negatively determined by AFDC/TANF generosity, the opposite is true for welfare receipt.
And finally, the estimates for the year indicators demonstrate that AFDC/TANF receipt fell from the first to the final survey year while the opposite is true for SSI. These results suggest that while many family characteristics similarly determine SSI and welfare receipt, there are some important differences as well.
IV. Estimating the Causal Effect of Child SSI Receipt on Household Outcomes
We now turn our attention to estimating the impact of child SSI participation on household outcomes, including earned income, total income, poverty status, and health insurance coverage. Our empirical strategy is to exploit the longitudinal nature of the SIPP to determine whether there is a break in household outcomes corresponding to the period in which the household first receives child SSI benefits. 
A. Mean Outcomes for Households with Children
21 After the first wave individuals may separate from the initial households to form new households though for the purposes of our analysis we combine information in each wave for all individuals in the same wave one household.
If an individual joins the SIPP in a subsequent wave (e.g. because of marriage) then this individual is attached to the same wave one sample unit as others in his/her current household. 22 Though there is a variable in the 1992 and 1993 SIPP surveys indicating whether a child and/or an adult is enrolled in SSI, this variable is almost always missing after the first wave. These earlier years of survey data are thus not reliable sources of data for our empirical strategy. Children in households with child SSI income are less likely than those on AFDC to live in poverty, with this difference especially pronounced for deep poverty, which we define to be less than 50 percent of the poverty line. While 34 percent of households with children on AFDC were in deep poverty, just 6 percent of families with a child on SSI were. These lower poverty rates are to some extent driven by the much higher average earnings among households with a child on SSI though also by the more generous benefits. In 1996, average earnings were $1,028 greater ($4,735 versus $3,707) during the fourmonth period in households with a child on SSI than in households with some AFDC income. These differences could be partially attributable to differences in labor supply incentives given that the incentive for a parent to work was much greater if his/her child was on SSI than if the family was on AFDC. 23 The differences in average earnings were even larger in 2001. This was true even though TANF incorporates work requirements and more generous earnings disregards than AFDC. This suggests that at least part of the difference in earnings may be mechanical or driven by differences in the characteristics of recipients of the two programs.
24 23 For example, a single parent with one child could have earned more than $1000 per month before the child's SSI benefits would decline. The tax rate on benefits in the phase-out region would be 50 percent. In most states the earnings disregard for AFDC would have been much lower and the effective tax rate on earnings much higher. See, for example, the case of Pennsylvania summarized in Table 7 -3 of the 1998 Overview of Entitlement Programs. 24 There are of course many other possible explanations for these differences. For example, given the sharp decline in AFDC/TANF receipt the average characteristics of those receiving welfare benefits may have changed substantially during this five year period. Additionally a much smaller fraction of households with a child on SSI are also receiving traditional welfare benefits. This may partially explain the increase in earnings for this group.
A third notable difference between the two groups is that the fraction of households with food stamp benefits is substantially greater among welfare households than households with child SSI benefits- The differences summarized here suggest that the enrollment of a child on the SSI program may have a substantial effect on household outcomes such as earned income, total income, poverty, and health insurance coverage. However, given that families with higher incomes can be eligible for SSI, it is not obvious how much of these differences are mechanical (i.e., a reflection of program rules) or simply the result of other differences between the two groups. For example Powers (2003) finds that children's health (which will be correlated with child SSI receipt) exerts an important effect on parental labor supply decisions, especially for female-headed households. This motivates the empirical analyses that follow.
B. Empirical Specification
As discussed above, cross-sectional comparisons of households with and without child SSI benefits would almost certainly confound any effects on household outcomes due to program 25 An alternative explanation is that some households enrolled in private Medicaid managed care plans may report private health insurance rather than Medicaid in the survey, as Medicaid managed care grew substantially in the U.S. from 1996 to 2001 (Duggan, 2004) .
participation with selection effects and/or the independent effect of having a disabled child in the household. To overcome this identification problem, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the SIPP to explore whether the enrollment of a child on SSI leads to a discernable shift in family outcomes. We are able to control for household fixed effects in our empirical model to capture any time-invariant differences across households in the sample.T P
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To attribute a causal interpretation to any observed change in outcomes, even with the inclusion of household fixed effects, it must be the case that other factors that influence the outcome variable Y are not changing at precisely the same time that the child enrolls in SSI. Though such an assumption would not be appropriate for an examination of the effects of many other transfer programs, it seems defensible in the present setting for two reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of children enrolled in SSI have a chronic rather than an acute condition. It is therefore unlikely that the severity of the child's illnesswhich could have an independent effect on household outcomes -would change discontinuously at precisely the time that the award is made. Second, it seems unlikely that parents would alter their labor supply in anticipation of SSI benefits as the majority of applications are denied and even in those cases when an application is accepted, there is a substantial lag between initial application and receipt of benefits.T P
27
P T Fortunately, we need not rely on these assumptions holding absolutely. An important advantage of the SIPP data is that we can actually observe whether household outcomes change noticeably in the months leading up to SSI benefit receipt compared to earlier periods.
Our two main estimation equations are specified as follows:
This strategy is similar to the approach taken by Currie and Thomas (1995) in their study of health insurance effects using longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey. An alternative strategy that we have explored is using the generosity of AFDC/TANF benefits in the state or the presence of a state SSI supplement to instrument for child SSI enrollment. Unfortunately given the relatively low fraction of children on SSI, the limited effect of both variables on SSI enrollment, and the number of households in the SIPP, we do not have sufficient statistical power to use this strategy for estimating the effect of child SSI.
T P
27
P T
We might be concerned about an "Ashenfelter dip" driving selection into the program -if parents apply to enroll their child on SSI when they experience a negative shock in economic circumstances, we might observe a bounce back of their economic situation when the child finally begins to receive benefits. This might lead us to erroneously attribute to child SSI participation. Comparing household outcomes in the months leading up to SSI benefit receipt to outcomes in earlier months will help determine if this type of phenomenon is driving any of our results. households that ever enroll a child on SSI or only on households that report having a disabled child.
If our identifying assumptions hold, then the estimated coefficient on POST_SSI in equation (2) will capture the average effect of SSI enrollment on the outcome variable of interest for those households that enroll a child in SSI. Estimation of equation (3) The model controls for household fixed effects j µ to difference out unobserved, time-invariant differences across households. An important household characteristic that is changing over time, and hence not controlled for with household fixed effects, is the age composition of children. We thus include a vector jt X of the number of individuals in five different age ranges (0-5, 6-11, 12-14, 15-17, and 18 plus years). The regression model also includes indicator variables for 21 waves -twelve for the 1996
We define a household based on wave one household, so if a household were to split in a later wave, the data for all splintered households would be aggregated to the original household in all subsequent waves. We use waves rather than months as our time period because of the well-documented "seam bias" in the SIPP. This term is used to describe the much higher rate of employment, insurance, and other transitions between waves than within waves. Because of this it is not clear that month-to-month variation is as reliable as wave-to-wave variation. survey and nine for the 2001 survey. These are included to capture any changes over time in the outcomes variable of interest that are common across households and unrelated with SSI enrollment.
It is important to emphasize that this empirical strategy identifies the average effect of child SSI enrollment only for those households that enroll a child in the program. This may differ substantially from the corresponding effect for households with children not on SSI, either those who applied and were rejected or those who never applied. In particular, the fact that these households have disabled children suggests that their response to program benefits or incentives may be quite different from the response that would be found were SSI to be expanded to households with healthier children. Our estimated effects in the analyses that follow should therefore be interpreted as the average effect for households with a child on SSI. This effect is commonly referred to in the program evaluation literature as the average effect of treatment on the treated (Heckman et al, 2001 ).
V. The Effect of Child SSI Participation on Household Outcomes
A. Unearned Income
We begin our investigation of the effect of child SSI enrollment by estimating the average change in transfer income in households that enroll a child in SSI. Table 4 presents the results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of equations (2) and (3). The first two panels report results for Y jt defined as total SSI benefits, which is the sum of child and adult benefits received by household members. The latter definition allows us to consider that some children on SSI will reach the age of 18 during our study period or that some households may not correctly identify their SSI income as child versus adult income in every wave. The estimated coefficient on POST_SSI implies a statistically significant increase in total 
B. Total Household Earnings and Income
Having established that total unearned income increases by an average of roughly $400 per month after child SSI enrollment, we now investigate to what extent this is offset (or augmented) by a change in earnings and what the net change in total household earnings is. A large body of previous research has investigated the labor supply incentives of the AFDC and TANF programs. Only one paper of which we are aware considers the effect of child enrollment in SSI on labor supply. Kubik (1999) uses CPS data to investigate whether the labor supply of single women with children and with some household SSI income is different from their observably similar counterparts with no household SSI benefits. 29 He uses differences across states in the incentive to apply for SSI to instrument for program enrollment and his findings suggest that SSI reduced parental labor supply. But as mentioned above, the CPS does not differentiate between child and adult SSI receipt and the disincentive to work is much greater if the adult, rather than the child, is the SSI participant. Therefore, Kubik's conclusion that child SSI receipt reduces labor supply could simply reflect the effect of adult SSI enrollment.
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As described above, average earnings in households with a child on SSI are substantially greater than in households with welfare income. This could be a mechanical reflection of higher break-even levels for the SSI or reflect the fact that children on SSI are more likely to live with both parents.
Alternatively, it might reflect the fact that the program's rules do not discourage earnings as explicitly as the rules of pre-reform AFDC. It might also be the case that the labor supply decisions of parents with disabled children are more complicated than the traditional labor supply model posits. An increase in transfer income to these households might have a negative income effect; in particular, it might enable a parent to stay home to care for the child. On the other hand, it might allow a parent to buy specialized child care thereby "freeing up" their time for work outside the home. In other words, both the sign and the magnitude of the effect of child SSI enrollment on household earnings is theoretically ambiguous.
The first six columns of Table 5 report the results of OLS estimation of equation [2] where Y jt is defined as an indicator for whether the household has positive earnings, the natural logarithm of household earnings, and the level of household earnings. The regression-adjusted estimates in the first 29 Neumark and Powers (2004) investigate the effect of SSI on the labor supply of near elderly individuals. Once an individual reaches the age of 65, he/she can become eligible for the program even without a disability if income and assets are sufficiently low. Their findings suggest that people strategically reduce their labor supply as they approach the age of 65 to qualify for benefits. 30 As Kubik (1999) notes, "it is not possible to separate the effects of net SSI benefit generosity on the probability of SSI receipt of children and parents using the variation created by the interaction of the AFDC and SSI benefit schedules." According to our SIPP data, households with children and with some SSI income are actually more likely to have an adult rather than a child SSI recipient. two columns suggest that child SSI enrollment has little impact on this extensive margin of labor supply.
The statistically insignificant point estimate of .005 (standard error of .016) implies a 0.5 percentage point increase in this probability after a child enrolls in SSI. The next two columns summarize the results from analogous specifications of the log of earnings, thereby dropping observations with earnings less than or equal to zero. The statistically insignificant estimate for the POST SSI coefficient of -.023 in column (3) suggests a 2.3 percent decline in earnings among those working. However, the pattern of coefficients in the estimation of equation [3] suggests that there is potentially a decline in the period of child SSI The absence of a substantial reduction in earnings, coupled with the large increase in total transfer income, suggests a substantial increase in total household income. The regression-adjusted effects reported for total household income in the final two panels of Table 5 confirm this prediction. Columns (7) and (8) present the estimated effects for total household income in levels and columns (9) and (10) present the estimated effects for the dependent variable defined as the natural logarithm of total household income. The simple pre-post estimate suggests an increase of $1,265 (standard error of 350), which is more than 72 percent of the corresponding estimate for total SSI income. In the more descriptive equation, the estimated coefficient on PRE_MONTHS_1-4 is -106 (standard error of 478) and the estimated coefficient on FIRST_SSI is $1,455 (standard error of 502), suggesting a change in income of $1,561 per wave, or $390 per month corresponding to the wave of child enrollment in SSI. The estimated impact on total household income is higher in the next four months and is subsequently less.
We next estimate equations [2] and [3] for the dependent variable defined as the log of total household income. This specification has two advantages: the effect of outliers on the OLS estimate is mitigated and changes can be interpreted as proportional changes. The results from this specification demonstrate a statistically significant increase in household income of 21.9 percent (e 0.198 -1) following child enrollment in SSI. The pattern of coefficients estimated for equation [3] suggests little change in total income in the months preceding enrollment, but a statistically significant increase post child SSI enrollment in the range of 20 and 25 percent, with the impact decreasing slightly over time.
C. Poverty
We now turn our attention to the effect of child SSI enrollment on economic well-being as measured by poverty status. The findings from the preceding two sections suggest that SSI benefits increase household income by an average of 72 cents on the dollar. Despite this, it is possible that the program does little to reduce poverty. First, if children awarded SSI benefits are not initially in poverty then they cannot be lifted out of it. On the other hand, if children awarded SSI live in households with very little income or if it offsets some other sources of income, then the increase in transfer income might not be sufficient to lift them out of poverty.
In Table 6 we report the results for estimation of equations (7) and (8) define the dependent variable as the number of children in household j living below the poverty threshold. And finally, the last two panels in columns (9) through (12) report the results for Y jt defined as the number of people in household j living below the poverty threshold and above 200 percent of the poverty threshold, respectively. The poverty threshold is the census poverty threshold of income in the year for a household and is provided in the SIPP given the number of adults and children. We adjust the threshold to correspond to recorded income in the SIPP, which is defined over a four-month period. We define the number of children and people in poverty as the number of children and people in the household multiplied by an indicator for whether total household income is below the relevant poverty threshold.
The estimated effects reported in Table 6 demonstrate that child SSI participation does substantially lower poverty. Specifically, the regression-adjusted pre-post comparison reported in column
(1) suggests that the probability that a household's income is below the poverty line falls by 10.8
percentage points (standard error of 1.8) following the child's enrollment in SSI. This effect is persistent, as the coefficient estimates from the more descriptive specification reveal. The likelihood that a household is in poverty two waves after child SSI enrollment is 10.4 percentage points lower than it is three waves prior to enrollment (standard error of 2.4). The next two columns explore whether the effect is driven by a reduction in deep poverty, defined as less than 50 percent of the poverty line. The estimates in columns (3) and (4) reveal that it is, with deep poverty falling by almost 7.6 percentage points (standard error of 1.7) following the first receipt of child SSI benefits. This effect also appears to be persistent.
As mentioned above, many non-poor households are income-eligible for the SSI program. It is therefore plausible that the program not only reduces poverty, but also increases the income of families further up in the income distribution. The results reported in columns (5) and (6) provide support for this effect, with the probability that a household's income is more than twice its reported poverty line increasing by 8.1 percentage points. As was true for both poverty and deep poverty, this effect is persistent.
In the next two columns we explore the effect of SSI enrollment on the number of children in poverty. These specifications consider that many child SSI recipients have one or more siblings who are not on the program and hence the impact on the number of children might be greater than the impact on households. The estimated impacts reported in columns (7) and (8) suggest that the number of children lifted out of poverty is twice as large as the number of households. The effect is even greater for the number of people in poverty and the number of people with household incomes more than twice the poverty level. According to the estimates presented in columns (9) and (11), for every 100 children who are awarded SSI benefits, roughly 37 people are lifted out of poverty and 28 see their household incomes increase to more than twice their poverty level. Again, these effects appear to be persistent. we would see no impact on either Medicaid or on health insurance. Or, he might have previously been covered through private health insurance or through another government program, in which case his enrollment in Medicaid would have no effect on the probability of health insurance coverage. This latter example would provide a possible mechanism through which Medicaid enrollment could crowd out other health insurance coverage.
D. Health Insurance Coverage
33 Table 7 presents our estimates for the effect of child SSI enrollment on the number of children in the household with Medicaid 34 , with any health insurance, and with private health insurance. Columns 1, 4, and 7 report the results from estimating equation [2] on these three outcome variables. The statistically significant point estimate of 0.099 in column 1 implies that for every 100 children awarded SSI benefits, approximately 10 become newly eligible for Medicaid benefits. The fact that the point estimate is much less than one is not surprising when one considers that more than 60 percent of children in these households were on Medicaid in the wave before the first receipt of SSI benefits. The corresponding estimate for the number of children with any health insurance is less than half as large and statistically insignificant. Taking the ratio of the two point estimates, it appears that just 41 percent of those children 31 In forty out of fifty-one states, SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid. Eleven states use more restrictive criteria when determining Medicaid eligibility (SSA, 2004) . 32 If that child has siblings who were eligible for Medicaid but not covered, his enrollment in SSI could potentially lead the family to learn of their Medicaid eligibility and enroll the other children in the household in Medicaid. In that case, we could observe an increase in Medicaid and health insurance coverage of greater than one-for-one. 33 In the seminal paper on the topic, Cutler and Gruber (1996) evaluated the impact of the Medicaid program expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s and estimated take-up rates among the newly eligible of 24 percent and crowd-out propensities of about 7 percent. Subsequent papers have found smaller rates of both take-up and crowdout. Shore-Sheppard (2005) revisits the Cutler and Gruber approach and finds crowd-out propensities of close to zero. It is worth noting that the take-up and crowd-out rates associated with child SSI participation need not be similar to those associated with the Medicaid expansions. 34 If a child is enrolled in the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) then we code them as being covered by Medicaid.
made eligible for Medicaid were previously without health insurance.
As previous work has noted, one possible effect of Medicaid enrollment is a reduction in private health insurance coverage (Cutler and Gruber, 1996) . The specification summarized in column (7) investigates this possibility by testing whether private insurance coverage declines following the first receipt of SSI benefits. The point estimate of -.026 suggests that there may be some crowdout, though the estimate is not statistically significant.
The summary statistics presented in Table 3 suggest that the effect of child SSI enrollment on health insurance coverage may differ in the latter part of our study period. As the table shows, Medicaid enrollment is substantially lower and private insurance coverage is much higher among families with a child on SSI in early 2001 than in early 1996. This may to some extent reflect the decline in TANF enrollment among households with a child on SSI (from 34.3 to 14.5 percent), which has reduced the number of children categorically eligible for Medicaid. To investigate whether the effect is different in the latter part of our study period, we interact the POST_SSI indicator with two survey indicators. The results for these specifications are summarized in columns 2, 5, and 8. Interestingly while the estimated effect on Medicaid coverage is substantially greater for the 2001 sample, there is no corresponding difference for any health insurance coverage. This is apparently because SSI enrollment has, according to the significantly negative estimate of -.145 in column 8, significantly reduced private health insurance coverage among children in the more recent part of our study period.
Columns (3), (6), and (9) of Table 7 explore the pattern of changes in health insurance coverage in the months leading up to and immediately following the first receipt of SSI benefits. Consistent with the previous results, the estimated effect for Medicaid is much larger than for any health insurance coverage. But the effect on Medicaid appears to be short-lived, as the point estimate for the POST_MONTHS_5-8+ coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. Taken together, this set of results suggests that enrollment of a child on SSI has little effect on the health insurance coverage of children in affected households. This is partially driven by the fact that more than 82 percent of children in these households already had health insurance from another source in the wave prior to enrollment.
VI. Robustness of Findings to Alternative Analysis Samples
The results presented so far use all 20,949 households with children in the first wave of the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP to estimate the effect of child SSI enrollment. We include all households rather than only those with a child on SSI to control for macroeconomic conditions and related factors that may lead to changes over time in earnings, poverty, and health insurance coverage that are unrelated to the SSI program. One potential concern with this approach is that, even though our identification strategy primarily exploits within-household variation in SSI enrollment, our "control group" may be too broad. Trends in earnings for very high income households or for households without any disabled children may, for example, be very different from those for children who apply for and/or eventually receive SSI benefits. If this were true, it could bias our estimates.
To gauge the potential importance of this issue, in Table 8 we summarize the results from additional specifications in which we use five alternative analysis samples. The first column lists the estimates summarized above in Tables 4 through 7 for the POST_SSI indicator. In column (2) we present an analogous set of results for households that ever report receiving or applying for SSI benefits. 35 This reduces the number of households in our sample from 20,949 to 2,715. The pattern of estimates is quite similar and suggests that SSI enrollment leads to a significant reduction in child poverty, a significant increase in Medicaid coverage, and has little effect on the extensive margin of household labor supply.
The most notable difference in the estimates exists in the log(earnings) specification, with the results for the more narrowly defined sample suggesting that enrollment of a child on SSI reduces conditional earnings by approximately 11 percent. This decline is not nearly sufficient, however, to offset the increase in unearned income, with total household income estimated to increase by more than 17 percent.
The estimated effect for health insurance coverage is also marginally significant for this sample, though the point estimate is just half as large as the corresponding estimate for Medicaid coverage.
In the specifications that are summarized in column (3), we include only those households that 35 In the first wave of the SIPP, individuals who are not receiving SSI are asked whether they have ever applied for SSI benefits. This variable is unfortunately not asked in every wave.
report having an activity-limited child with a disability between the ages of 6 and 14. 36 Because some of the children on SSI are outside of this age range and because some parents may not report their children's conditions, more than half of the households with a child on SSI are not in this sample. As a result the standard errors increase in all specifications but the pattern of results is quite consistent with the previous ones. In the next column we include all households either reporting a disability in their child or who have a child enrolled in SSI during our study period. The estimates are quite similar to those in column three and suggest that enrollment of a child on SSI reduces poverty and increases Medicaid coverage but has little impact on either household earnings or the number of children without health insurance.
The specifications summarized in the final two columns include only those households that report having a child on SSI at some point during the survey, with column 5 including those enrolled in the first wave and column 6 excluding them. The pattern of estimates is quite similar to the ones using alternative control groups in the previous four columns. In all six specifications the estimate for poverty is significantly negative and the estimated effect on Medicaid coverage is significantly positive. The estimated effect for the presence of any household earnings is small and precisely estimated, ranging from a low of -.006 to a high of .012. It therefore appears that enrollment of a child on SSI does not lead to a significant change in labor force participation. The estimates for conditional earnings are all negative and range from implying a 2 to a 13 percent decline.
Given the similarity of the estimates across the different sets of specifications, our initial set of findings appears to be robust. The growth in SSI enrollment has substantially improved the material wellbeing of families with disabled children while having very little impact on household earnings or health insurance coverage.
VII. Discussion
In this paper we have documented the growing importance of the federal SSI program as a source of cash assistance for low-income families with children. Our investigation of the impact of SSI on household outcomes suggests that this rise in child SSI participation may have played an important role in 36 This question is asked only during the fifth wave of the SIPP.
maintaining the material well-being of low-income families with children since the changes to the federal AFDC/TANF program that were implemented in 1996. Our analysis of household-level SIPP data finds that child SSI participation increases total household income by an average of approximately $316 per month, or 20 percent. This is accomplished by a substantial increase in transfer income that is only partially offset by a reduction in other transfer income and earnings. Put differently, for every 100 dollars in SSI income transferred to a family, total income increases by more than 72 dollars. Our findings suggest that enrollment of a child in the program has little impact on the extensive margin of labor supply, but the pattern of coefficients over time and across various samples suggests that there might be an offset of conditional earnings on the order of 5 to 10 percent. While we usually consider an offset of earnings to be a negative consequence of transfer programs, to the extent that parents are reducing their earnings to stay home and provide care for a disabled child, any offset of earnings might actually be considered in line with child SSI program goals.
Furthermore, the data suggest that SSI participation is targeted at families such that there is a substantial decrease in poverty. Our analysis suggests that the probability that a household lives in poverty falls by 10.8 percentage points when a child enrolls in SSI and that this reduction in poverty is driven by a reduction in severe poverty, defined as having household income of less than 50 percent of the census poverty threshold. The data suggest that for every 100 children who enroll in SSI, 22 children and 37 people are lifted out of poverty and an additional 28 people see their incomes increase to more than twice the poverty line. These results suggest that the increase in child SSI enrollment over the past 15 years has potentially played a large role in lowering child poverty rates. Aggregating these effects to the national level, our findings suggest there are approximately 160,000 fewer children in poverty than there would have been absent the increase in child SSI enrollment since 1989.
The data do not indicate a significant effect of SSI participation on health insurance coverage, though there is some evidence of a significant increase in the number of children receiving Medicaid.
This set of findings has two important implications. First, though SSI participation entitles a child to Medicaid coverage, it does not appear to be an effective way to increase health insurance coverage among low-income children. Second, the SIPP data indicate that the majority of children who enrolled in SSI were already receiving Medicaid. This suggests that the average cost of enrolling a child on SSI is much lower than the sum of cash benefits plus Medicaid expenditures would imply. Given that Medicaid expenditures for SSI recipients are substantially larger than cash benefits paid, this is an important fact.
37
There are two important limitations to this paper that deserve mention. First, our empirical results shed light on the impact of child SSI enrollment for those families with children who are awarded benefits. To the extent that those whose applications are denied or those who do not apply for the program are different that the households who do enroll a child in the program, the results here will not generalize.
That is, instead of representing the average treatment effect of child SSI receipt, our estimates capture the average effect on those who receive this treatment. Similarly, it is important to note that the function of SSI as an anti-poverty program is limited to households with a child having a severe health impairment.
Second, because the SIPP includes only three or four years of longitudinal data, our estimates will not capture the long run impact of child SSI receipt. Future work should investigate the long-run effects of the program, in particular because the average duration on SSI is longer than on traditional welfare.
Future work should also investigate additional measures of family well-being, including how families use the additional income that they receive from the SSI program. Recent work has explored the effect of changes in income resulting from welfare reform and changes in tax policy on measures of well-being such as consumption and educational attainment (Meyer and Sullivan, 2004; Dahl and Lochner, 2005) .
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FIRST WAVE WITH CHILD SSI
Sample consists of all 20949 households from the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP with a child between the ages of 0 and 14 in the first wave of the survey and who are still present in wave two. Unit of observation is a household-wave and the number of observations is listed for each specification. This is sometimes less than 195871 if the dependent variable is a log measure because values less than or equal to zero will be missing. All specifications include 20949 household and 21 wave*year fixed effects. The variable POST SSI is equal to one in the first wave that the child is eligible for SSI and in all subsequent waves and is zero otherwise. The even-numbered columns have indicators for the wave of the first SSI enrollment along with two pre and post variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level.
(1) Sample consists of all 20949 households from the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP with a child between the ages of 0 and 14 in the first wave of the SIPP and who are still present in wave two. Unit of observation is a household-wave and there are 195871 observations in all cases. All specifications include 20949 household and 21 wave*year fixed effects. The explanatory variable in the odd-numbered columns is equal to one in the first wave that the child is eligible for SSI and in all subsequent waves and is zero otherwise. The even-numbered columns have indicators for the wave of the first SSI enrollment along with two pre and post variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level.
(1) 
Sample consists of all 20949 households from the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP with a child between the ages of 0 and 14 in the first wave of the SIPP and who are still present in wave two. Unit of observation is a household-wave and there are 195871 observations in all cases. All specifications include 20949 household and 21 wave*year fixed effects. The explanatory variable for the specification summarized in columns 1, 4, and 7 is equal to one in the first wave that the child is eligible for SSI and in all subsequent waves and is zero otherwise. In specifications 2, 5, and 8, this variable is interacted with two dummy variables reflecting each of the survey years. Specifications 3, 6, and 9 have indicators for the wave of the first SSI enrollment along with two pre and post variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level. Tables 4-7 . Each coefficient estimate reported in the table is from a different specification. Unit of observation in each specification is the household-wave. All specifications include household and wave fixed effects and are weighted using the SIPP household weights in each wave.
